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ARGUMENT
The court of appeals erred in concluding that Pham failed to demonstrate
that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated for two reasons. First, under
Crawford, preliminary testimony of unavailable witnesses should only be allowed
at trial in exceptional circumstances, which did not exist in Pham’s trial. Second,
even if preliminary cross-examination in Utah presumptively satisfies Crawford’s
requirements, introduction of preliminary testimony at Pham’s trial violated
Pham’s Crawford rights.
A. Under Crawford, Preliminary Testimony of Unavailable Witnesses
Should Only Be Allowed at Trial in Exceptional Circumstances,
Which Did Not Exist in Pham’s Trial.
The States’ responsive brief accurately frames the positions of the parties as
mirror images of each other. Pham contends that preliminary testimony of an
unavailable witness should only be admitted at trial in exceptional circumstances.
The State contends that preliminary testimony of an unavailable witness should
always be admitted absent exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, Pham and the
State disagree about whether there is a presumption that cross-examination of an
unavailable witness satisfies Crawford’s procedural requirement, namely, “not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross examination.” Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S.Ct.
1354 (2004).
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The court of appeals failed to apply a legal standard to determine if Pham’s
Sixth Amendment rights were violated. The court of appeals determined that
Pham’s Crawford rights were satisfied during his preliminary hearing while
declining to determine when preliminary hearings satisfy Crawford. The court of
appeals merely concluded that cross-examination in Utah’s preliminary hearing
framework can sometimes satisfy Crawford’s procedural requirements. Pham, 2016
UT App at ¶¶12, 17, 18. However, the court refused to determine when a defendant
has a full opportunity to cross examine a witness during a preliminary hearing.
Id. at ¶18. The court also explicitly declined to determine whether the holding of
Brookes, i.e. “cross-examination takes place at preliminary hearing and at trial
under the same motive and interest,” remains true in the post-Crawford context.
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 1981); Pham, UT App at footnote 3.
The court of appeals justified its refusal to apply a legal test to determine
whether Pham’s constitutional rights were violated by stating that Pham did “not
allege that his motivation to cross examine Victim changed between the
preliminary hearing and trial” or that “the trial court limited his cross-examination
in any way.” However, Pham’s opening brief alleged that the trial court did limit
his cross-examination at preliminary hearing. Opening Brief at 19 (“Pham does
not contest that he was given opportunity to cross, but rather that cross
examination at a preliminary hearing is limited in scope and opportunity and
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therefore inadequate”) (“Pham admits that he was not expressly limited in his
cross-examination, but rather the nature of the preliminary hearing necessarily
constricts confrontation”). Pham contended that his motivation at preliminary
hearing differed from his motivation at trial because credibility was not an issue
during preliminary hearing. Id at 21. Credibility was a key issue at Pham’s trial.
In Timmerman, this Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to
effective cross-examination of a witness does not exist during a preliminary
hearing, but is a trial right. 2015 UT at ¶¶10, 13. This holding makes sense because
during a preliminary hearing a magistrate has limited discretion to determine
witness credibility, Schmidt, 2015 UT at ¶13, and reasonable inferences are to be
decided in favor of the prosecution, Jones, 2016 UT at ¶27. Thus, defendants lack
a motive to cross-examine a witness to both test the “recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness,” and to compel that witness to “stand face to face with
the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief.” Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
The only motive for a defendant to conduct such a cross-examination is that
the examination may be used at trial.

To use this motivation to justify the

conclusion that defendants have this same motivation at trial as preliminary
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hearing is circular reasoning because without begging the conclusion that
preliminary testimony may be used at trial, no such motivation exists.
The State argues for a presumption that cross-examination at preliminary
hearings satisfies Crawford, absent exceptional circumstances, by citing to preCrawford case law. At page 10 of the State’s responsive brief, the State proposes a
test for determining when prior cross-examination satisfies a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation:
Preliminary hearings in Utah—notwithstanding their limited
purpose—retain the relevant attributes that the Supreme Court has
held make them “trial-like”: witnesses are placed under oath, testify
at a recorded hearing in front of a judge, the defendant is represented
by counsel, and he has a rule-based right to cross-examine. And
defense counsel is animated by the same motive and interest—to
further the defendant’s chances of success—at preliminary hearing no
less than at trial, notwithstanding a state constitutional amendment
permitting the State to present reliable hearsay at preliminary
hearings.
The State’s proposed test is no longer good law. This test was used in the
pre-Crawford cases of California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-166 (1970), and in State
v. Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541. However, as the court of appeals stated, it is “unclear
whether Brooks’s blanket statement that ‘cross-examination takes place at
preliminary hearing and at trial under the same motive and interest’ is still true
insofar as Confrontation clause rights are concerned.” Pham, 2016 UT App at
footnote 3. The presumption that preliminary cross-examination satisfies the Sixth
Amendment does not represent a “long unbroken line of decisions” because the
4

prior test assumed reliability as the purpose of the Sixth Amendment’s
confrontation clause. See Brief of Respondent at p.12. Crawford fundamentally
altered this assumption, upon which the test from Green and Brooks relied.
Crawford 541 U.S. 61-63 (“[a]dmitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation”) (“[d]ispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with
jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty”).
Pham respectfully requests that this Court determine what the court of
appeals refused to determine, namely, when preliminary cross-examination
satisfies Crawford’s requirements.

If it is possible for the cross-examination

opportunity at a preliminary hearing to satisfy a defendant’s constitutional right
of confrontation, when does preliminary cross-examination satisfy this
constitutional right?

In requesting that this Court use a legal standard to

determine whether Pham’s constitutional rights were violated, Pham does not
request an advisory opinion as the State asserts at page 35 of its brief. Rather,
Pham requests that his constitutional rights be adjudicated under the Doctrine of
Stare Decisis which is “a cornerstone of the Anglo-American jurisprudence that is
crucial to the predictability of the law and the fairness of adjudication.” State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256
(Utah 1993)).
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At least one other State has determined that preliminary cross-examination
of an unavailable witness does not presumptively satisfy Crawford’s requirements.
In People v. Fry, the Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that due to the limited
nature of Colorado’s preliminary hearing framework, the opportunity for crossexamination was insufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 92 P.3d 970, 977
(Colo. 2004). The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that defense counsel had no
motive to engage in credibility inquires during preliminary cross-examination
because credibility was not an issue during a preliminary hearing. Id. at 977-978
(stating “opportunity for cross-examination regarding the credibility of a witness,
as a matter of fact, exists only to the extent that an attorney persists in asking
questions that have no bearing on the issues before the court, and such irrelevant
questioning is not prohibited by the court”).
This Court should determine that preliminary hearings in Utah do not
presumptively satisfy Crawford’s requirements absent exceptional circumstances.
The Colorado Supreme Court’s reasoning applies in Utah because credibility is not
an issue in Utah preliminary hearings. Schmidt, 2015 UT at ¶13; State v. Droesbeke,
2010 UT App 275, ¶18, 241 P.3d 772. Exceptional circumstances do not exist in this
case because the structural limitations of Utah Preliminary hearings provided
Pham no motivation to cross-examine the credibility of his accuser during
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preliminary hearing and because the credibility of Pham’s accuser was a key issue
at Pham’s trial.
B. Even if Preliminary Cross-Examination in Utah Presumptively
Satisfy Crawford’s Requirements, Introduction of Preliminary
Testimony at Pham’s Trial Violated Pham’s Crawford Rights.
In this case, Pham claimed that he was acting in self-defense when he shot
Menchaca. The testimony of Menchaca was directly opposed to this claim. The
credibility of each witness at the trial was critical. The jury heard Menchaca’s
testimony as read by a prosecutor. There was no chance for cross-examination
regarding Menchaca’s credibility and veracity.

The cross-examination of

Menchaca done at the preliminary hearing in this case was more akin to discovery
than to rigorous trial cross-examination. There was no opportunity for the jury to
observe his demeanor as he was cross-examined. Under the circumstances of the
trial in this case, such testimony is but a shell of the type of examination needed to
protect Pham’s Sixth Amendment rights to Confrontation because of the vastly
different purposes of a preliminary hearing and trial, as explained above.
The State would have it both ways: a criminal defendant cannot assert
Crawford rights at a preliminary hearing, yet this hearing does provide the
“opportunity” to fully and fairly confront the witness so the State can argue the
Crawford rights are fulfilled when it so chooses. The purpose of a preliminary
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hearing is solely to establish probable cause, the State’s argument leaves a
defendant to gamble with his rights at a preliminary hearing.
2015 UT at ¶10.

See Timmerman,

Even if the magistrate allows extensive cross at a preliminary

hearing, it is questionable whether that sort of “opportunity” satisfies the needs of
defense counsel when it comes time to cross-examination of a witness before a jury
at trial, because a defendant’s Crawford rights are trial rights. A preliminary
hearing in Utah is not “trial like.” The purpose of and the preparation for crossexamination at a preliminary hearing and at trial is vastly different.
This Court recently examined the preliminary hearing process in Utah very
thoroughly. As now mandated by this Court the preliminary hearing process does
not contemplate nor provide for a defendant’s confrontation Crawford rights under
the Sixth Amendment. The preliminary hearing process has such a low standard
of proof and its purpose so limited, that an adequate opportunity for crossexamination as required by Crawford does not generally exist under Utah’s current
preliminary hearing process. Defendant Pham’s Crawford rights were not met in
this case and the prior testimony of the Menchaca should have been excluded.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate Defendant’s conviction and remand the case for
a new trial excluding Menchaca’s preliminary hearing testimony if he continues
to be unavailable.

Dated this __6___ day of February, 2017

/s/ Michael J. Langford
Michael J. Langford
Attorney for the Appellant
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